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From The Editor…
We made it this time – but what about 2014?
Now, finally, after multiple delays we have the definitive result for the presidential election and results for the parliamentary elections 
will soon be announced. The uncertainty created by 
legal disputes and courts contradicting each other 
reveals some nasty snags lurking beneath the seemingly 
tranquil waters of Indonesian democracy.
The cases brought to the Constitutional Court by 
both pairs of losing presidential and vice presidential 
candidates clearly had little substance. It is a testament 
to the good sense of the head of the Court, Mahfud, 
that he quickly dismissed them. 
The cases seem to have been launched in a fit of pique. 
This is especially true in the case of Megawati, who still 
appears not to have come to terms even with her 2004 
defeat. It is now surely time for her to bow gracefully 
out of her current leading role in PDI-P. 
A key defining feature of a working democracy is that 
all parties accept defeat, in the knowledge that their 
turn will come and that their future victory will be 
respected by their opponents. The recent events suggest 
that many in Indonesia’s political elite, still mostly 
products of the Suharto era, are reluctant to accept 
the basic principle that makes regular and peaceful 
transfers of power possible.
In these circumstances, it is crucially important that 
electoral laws and regulations are clear, well thought 
out and tightly written. Arcane complexity and 
muddled ambiguity are open invitations for political 
operators to manipulate the rules and play the system 
for all they can get. 
This was exactly what happened with the thicket 
of unnecessary complexity in the legislation on the 
election of the House of Representatives (DPR). Does 
anyone—aside from a handful of policy wonks—
actually understand how one law could produce at least 
three competing interpretations, each of which could 
produce vastly different results for the representation of 
parties in the House? The interpretation issued by the 
Supreme Court would have given grossly exaggerated 
representation to the major parties.
Put very simply, instead of opting for the straight 
forward system of allocating votes to seats that is widely 
used for multi-member electoral systems across the 
world, the drafters of the electoral law played around 
with a complex procedure for recounting votes at the 
district and provincial level that opened the door for 
disputes. Both local and foreign observers close to the 
debate on the electoral law could see that conflict and 
delay was inevitable. 
In the case of the disputes over the presidential election, 
the temptation for the losers to challenge a clear and 
overwhelming victory was created by the mess with 
the voters list. But while everyone has been blaming 
the General Elections Commission (KPU) for this 
administrative train wreck, a major part of the blame 
must go to the antiquated system the inexperienced 
Commission members inherited. The respective roles 
and responsibilities of the KPU and the Ministry of 
Home Affairs are blurred and confused and the KPU is 
still not a fully independent body. 
Reforming and simplifying the electoral law, including 
changing the status and composition of the KPU, 
should be high on the agenda for the new Yudhoyono 
administration. It is not enough to simply replace all or 
some of the existing Commission members because the 
problem is more than just the incompetence of some 
individuals.
And what about the role of the Courts? It could be said 
that the Constitutional Court responded effectively in 
dealing with the disputes, but did the very existence of 
the Court as a new arena to challenge administrative 
and policy decisions create new openings for vexatious 
actions? The Court’s last-minute directives before 
the election to change procedures to allow voting for 
individual candidates placed the KPU under severe 
strain. The intervention of the Supreme Court in 
trying to change the application of the electoral law was 
highly questionable in constitutional terms.
We were lucky this time around that the presidential 
election result was so clear and the contrived challenges 
could be so easily dismissed. The public was plainly 
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unsympathetic to the losing parties’ claims: most 
people just want President Yudhyono to get on with 
the job.
But in 2014, Yudhoyono will not be on the scene and 
the contest may be close and bitterly contested. The 
Democrat Party has no-one remotely capable of filling 
his shoes and PDI-P has yet to move on from the 
Megawati era. Golkar is so desperate to find a credible 
new leader that even the grotesque figure of Tommy 
Suharto is being seriously considered in some circles. 
And while Prabowo received only derisory support in 
this election, he has won himself a role in the political 
game for the coming five years and will doubtlessly be 
using it to pursue his ambitions for 2014.
If the current system is used in the next election the 
prospects for conflict between evenly matched and 
ruthless candidates could be a serious threat to stability. 
It is not guaranteed that the best quality leadership 
will always emerge. We should not be complacent 
and allow in Indonesia the kind of turmoil that has 
shaken Thai democracy and continues to plague the 
Philippines. Indonesians are becoming justly proud of 
the achievements of three democratic elections, but 
beneath the surface there is major structural weakness.
With Yudhoyono’s currently unassailable political 
position, there is an opportunity to redesign the 
legislative and administrative infrastructure for 
elections. The opening should be exploited while it is 
still possible to do so. p
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Intelligence
Money politics and power struggles have began in earnest inside Golkar 
Party ahead of its Musyawarah Nasional (national congress) in early 
October.  The most important agenda item is the election of a new party 
chairman, replacing Jusuf Kalla, the former vice president— turned political 
rival— of President Yudhoyono.
The media has named three figures as Kalla’s possible successors: 
Coordinating Minister of People’s Welfare Aburizal Bakrie, media baron 
Surya Paloh, and businessman— and youngest son of New Order leader 
Suharto— Hutomo ‘Tommy’ Mandala Putra Suharto.
The national congress will take place in Riau province, a territory which is 
considered by many as a Bakrie stronghold. The selection of the province is 
quite strategic especially since Bakrie may not be popular in other provinces, 
especially in East Java, where he has been forced to deal with the mudflow 
disaster that many blame on Bakrie’s mining and exploring company, PT 
Lapindo. East Java is also considered a Paloh stronghold.
Bakrie is also said to be receiving support from President Yudhoyono. 
“Upon listening to a team of presidential advisors, including top level 
officials from State Intelligence Agency (BIN), the President has agreed to 
let Bakrie win the Golkar chairmanship. The President believes that Bakrie 
will be able to bring Golkar back into coalition with the government. So, 
the move will unify nationalist-based parties,” a Golkar official—who has 
been slotted to be the party’s secretary general alongside Bakrie—told 
the Report. “The government does not want to see Golkar becoming the 
opposition.” 
The relationship between Bakrie and Yudhoyono goes back to 2004, when 
Bakrie began to give political and financial support to Yudhoyono.
Despite the support of the President and top level BIN officials, Bakrie is 
likely to face tough competition against Paloh and Tommy. With the race 
heating, large amounts of money are being thrown around.
“As Bakrie disbursed funds to representatives of Golkar’s regional offices 
at district level (DPD II), Paloh and Tommy have at the same time given 
promises and allocated large amount of funds,” a Golkar source said.
According to the source, Bakrie has intensified his schedule of meetings 
with the party’s regional representatives and has given Rp 25 million (US$ 
2,500) to Rp 35 million to each representative at every meeting. Not to be 
outdone, Paloh has reportedly distributed similar funds to Golkar’s DPD II 
447 branch offices nationwide.
Tommy Suharto—and a lot of cash—shakes up the Golkar 
chairman race
Van Zorge Report      August 31, 2009 

Meanwhile, according to a member of the Golkar inner circle, Tommy 
promised Golkar executives at the regional chapters to disburse Rp 1 billion 
(US$ 100, 000) as compensation for their votes. 
Another source doubted that Bakrie would defeat Paloh easily, as a 
recent survey conducted by LSI showed that more than 50 percent of 
Golkar’s DPD II questioned Bakrie’s loyalty to the party, especially after 
its staggering defeat in the 2009 election. The source told the Report that 
Bakrie was very upset upon learning of the survey result, especially given 
that the survey was financed by Bakrie-funded Fox Indonesia.
Although a tough challenge may come from Paloh and his supporters, 
Bakrie would likely not have problems defeating Tommy. “Administratively, 
Tommy will not meet the requirements to fill the position as Golkar 
chairman because he has never served in the party’s executive structure,” the 
source said.
The source was referring to the party’s internal regulation which states 
that every candidate should have the experience of serving as executive 
of the party for at least one session. During the last days of Suharto’s 
administration, Tommy was elected only as a member of People’s 
Consultative Assembly (MPR), and not as the party’s representative.
In fact Tommy’s motivation may only be to split Bakrie’s vote. Should 
Tommy insist on competing in the Golkar’s chairmanship contest, it may 
not be the win the position himself but may be a ploy to eliminate support 
for Bakrie. Such a move could be supported by Golkar cadres who disagree 
with Bakrie’s idea of bringing Golkar into Yudhoyono’s coalition. Paloh is 
known as a Kalla loyalist and supports the idea of taking the party into the 
opposition against Yudhoyono’s Democrat Party.
Rifts between several executives of Golkar and Yudhoyono came to the 
surface after Yudhoyono publicly announced that he would not team up 
with Kalla in his 2009 presidential bid. Yudhoyono’s decision sparked anger 
among several Golkar executives, who ended up by withdrawing political 
support for Yudhoyono. p
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In Brief
The Yudhoyono government recognises that a return to sustained economic 
growth requires rebalancing the roles of the state and the private sector in 
the economy and a new regulatory environment. But it is increasingly clear 
that passing laws to that effect is only the first step in the process. 
During the Suharto days, the DPR passed any number of laws. The regime 
was highly legalistic: most government actions had some legal instrument to 
validate them. But laws were vague and imprecise, with clauses sometimes 
contradicting each other and often inconsistent with provisions in other 
laws.
None of this really mattered because the real legal instruments were 
implementing regulations drawn up by officials in the bureaucracy. There is 
nothing wrong in principle with filling out legislative detail in regulations: 
it is common international procedure. But under Suharto, legislation was 
deliberately left with gaping holes and ambiguities. This gave maximum 
discretion to officials to enforce the law in a way that provided wealth and 
influence to ministers, senior bureaucrats, the military and their friends in 
business.
Unfortunately, practices of this kind have continued into the post-reformasi 
era. We still see badly drafted laws, implementing regulations that are wide 
open to interpretation and official discretion and, most of all, huge delays in 
the issuing of regulations. Sometimes this is deliberate rent-seeking, other 
times it is simply the legacy of poor drafting skills and lack of technical 
capacity in the ministry to turn policy objectives into legal instruments. 
This kind of problem has become very clear in the efforts to reform the 
regularatory environment for infrastructure. There has been some apparent 
progress in recent years with the passage of a number of laws. These have 
included Law 28/2004 on road transport, 23/2007 on railways, 27/2007 
on coastal planning, 30/2007 on energy, 17/2008 on sea transport and 
1/2009 on air transport.
The basic objective behind all of this legislative activity has been to 
introduce new principles that would supersede the approach followed 
under the Suharto regime, including:
 •  An end to the state’s stranglehold over investment and operation 
   of  infrastructure by encouraging private sector participation in 
   “commercially viable” infrastructure, with “non-commercial” 
   infrastructure, such as in rural areas, funded by the government.
 
 •  The separation of regulatory and operating functions.
Implementing regulations stymie legislation on infrastructure
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     • The establishment of independent regulatory bodies.
     
 •  Encouragement of regional government involvement in 
   infrastructure development.
     
 •  Setting of prices and tariffs on a cost-recovery basis.
But the implementation of virtually none of these new principles has been 
fully elucidated in the various pieces of legislation. They must be given 
practical effect in regulations that are still being debated and drafted. 
Since the regulations involve a fundamental rearrangement of the balance of 
power between ministries, state-owned corporations and private businesses, 
as well as civil society organisations and the public, they have been very 
slow in coming. An array of vested interests have been keen to see that the 
regulations are delayed or are slanted in particular ways.
In sea transport and ports, it has proved very difficult to draw up 
guidelines to determine whether a particular port is commercially viable 
and thus whether it is open to private sector involvement. The proposal 
for port authorities in different areas has blurred the distinction between 
an operator and a regulator, functions that were supposed to be clearly 
separated according to the legislation.
In the railway sector, issues that need clarity include the respective 
positions of the owner of the track and the operator of the rolling stock. 
The involvement of provincial governments in the operation of railways 
also becomes an issue when a railway, such as the North Sumatra railway, is 
entirely within the boundaries of one province.
In the area of marine and coastal development, Law 27/2007 introduced 
the concept of “right of business in coastal waters” (HP3). The idea was to 
provide legal certainty for development in marine areas, but the elucidation 
of the concept was left to government regulation. Concerns that HP3 will 
lead to the appropriation of tracts of coastal waters by big business, together 
with problems in integrating regional government involvement, have 
ensured that the regulation has been stalled since 2007.
Ministries that were most dominated by the military under Suharto, such 
as transport and communications, drafted legislation that was most in 
need of clarification by regulation. And it has been in these sectors that 
the production of the necessary regulations has continued to be the most 
problematic.
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Despite consistent and pointed criticism from civil society and human 
rights groups, the state secrets bill will be passed by the House of 
Representatives in September, according to the Ministry of Defense, which 
has spearheaded the bill. When the bill goes into effect, it could be a major 
obstacle to efforts at rooting out government corruption and hindrance to 
efforts at developing transparency in the Indonesian government.
Though the bill has been under debate since 2004, it has not undergone 
significant revisions. Indonesian Legal Aid Foundation (YLBHI), Indonesia 
Corruption Watch (ICW), and Commission for the Disappeared and 
Victims of Violence (Kontras), among other civil and human rights groups, 
have publicly voiced concerns over the bill, including:
 • The scope: Articles 1, 3 and 4 state that information, goods or 
  activities may be classified as secret if their dissemination threatens 
  the defense or sovereignty of Indonesia. The sectors specified include: 
  defense, security, international relations, economic resilience, 
  national cryptology, and law enforcement. This is an extremely broad 
  definition and is open to interpretations that could include vast areas 
  of government policy.
 
 • Who decides: Articles 24 and 25 establish a State Secrecy Council, 
  which reports to the president and is chaired by the minister of 
  defense. Permanent members of the council are the ministers of 
  foreign affairs, home affairs, justice and human rights, and 
  communication and information, the attorney general, the 
  commander of the Indonesian army, the head of the state intelligence 
  agency, the chief of the national police, and the head of the national 
  archives. Non-permanent members are appointed by the minister of 
  defense. This focuses authority in very few hands and gives the 
  president enormous control.
 
 • No mechanism for challenge of classification: There is no mention 
  in the bill of judicial or legislative mechanisms through which the 
  status of information can be challenged. 
 
 • The state secrecy bill runs roughshod over the Freedom of Public 
  Information Law: The bill does not balance the state’s authority to 
  withhold information with the public’s right to information.
  
 • Criminal penalties: Article 35 outlines penalties for intentionally 
  distributing Top secret information: 7 years to a life sentence, fines 
State secrecy bill: “The bill is not in principle democratic.”*
* Military analyst Andi Widjajanto
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  from five hundred million to one billion Rupiah. In the context of 
  the draconian provision of the state secrets bill, these penalties 
  would represent a major deterrent to anyone attempting to challenge 
  the government’s power to restrict access to information.
The combination of these provisions together poses a grave danger to 
citizens’ rights to information about the policies and activities of their 
government, as well as undermining the fight against corruption. 
The scope of Indonesia’s states secrets is very similar to the policy of the 
United States. Indeed, Minister of Defense Juwono has often sought to 
quell concerns over the state secrecy bill by pointing out that countries like 
the United States and Australia have state secrecy laws. However, in other 
countries with state secrecy laws there are legal mechanisms for judicial 
and legislative oversight and challenges. The government must defend its 
classification of the information based on the potential harm created by 
releasing the information. 
Allowing ministers to classify information without external accountability 
aggravates the issues of scope and criminal penalties, and makes the state 
secrecy bill a multi-pronged attack on anti-corruption efforts and human
rights 
First, the bill may allow the classification of budgets and transactions. 
This opens the way for graft in any ministry that is under the scope of the 
bill. Considering the scope, this may be nearly all ministries and certainly 
includes the Ministry of Defense and economic and financial ministries.
 
Even if corruption is uncovered through non-classified means, and 
individuals are caught and brought to trial, classified documents cannot be 
used in court, nor do judges have the ability to challenge the classification.
Since documents are not admissible in court cases, it is likely that human 
rights and anti-corruption bodies, such as the Corruption Eradication 
Commission (KPK) or the National Commission for Human Rights, will 
be seeing fewer cases or weaker cases.
The possibility of criminal sanction may lead would-be whistleblowers 
to think twice about bringing complaints to these bodies. There are no 
penalties specified for state institutions or individuals in the event that they 
are responsible for the leak. 
The state secrecy bill is often presented as a necessary corollary to the 
Freedom of Public Information (FOI) law (see Van Zorge Report, August 28, 
2007), which will enter into effect in 2010. The FOI law has been praised 
as an important step toward building an open and democratic Indonesia. 
Van Zorge Report      August 31, 2009 
12
In Brief
It will establish independent public information commissions that will 
mediate disputes between public requests for information and government 
agencies. The FOI law specified several sectors that would not be under the 
new commissions’ mandate including:  state intelligence, law enforcement, 
business competitiveness, economic interests, and issues of national defense, 
security and resources. 
The problem, however, is that the state secrecy bill stands in direct 
contradiction to the FOI.  The principle at the center of the FOI is allowing 
maximum access to information with minimum exemptions.  The burden 
rests with the government to provide reasons why information cannot 
be shared. The State Secrets Bill, however, works under the principle of 
maximum exemptions and minimum access. The bill does not require the 
government to provide reasons based on the possible harm to national 
security or sovereignty that could result from the information becoming 
public. 
Even if piecemeal changes are made to the state secrecy bill, this principle 
will remain. What that amounts to, says YLBH chairman A. Patra M. 
Zen, is the government’s use of an outmoded paradigm that continues to 
privilege national security over human security. p
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The 9th International Congress on AIDS in Asia and the Pacific (ICAAP) was 
held in Bali, 9-13 August 2009. This issue’s special feature provides a snapshot 
of the state of HIV/AIDS in Indonesia and evaluates the government’s 
response towards the epidemic. All information provided below is based on 
official documents.
The HIV epidemic in Indonesia is amongst the fastest-growing in Asia. The 
number of HIV/AIDS cases has risen exponentially in the last five years. 
More than 270,000 Indonesians were estimated to have HIV/AIDS in 
2008. This accounts for around 0.3 percent of 15 to 49 year olds.
The Indonesian authorities, however, appear to be in a state of denial about 
the problem and government policy has in some ways gone backwards in the 
last five years. The government is both unwilling and incapable of coming 
up with a comprehensive approach for both prevention and treatment of 
HIV/AIDS in the archipelago. 
In comparison with much of Southeast Asia, epidemic trends in Indonesia 
are disturbing. The picture in the region varies, but Myanmar, Thailand 
and Cambodia show declines in HIV prevalence. Well-funded, politically 
supported campaigns in Cambodia and Thailand have led to significant 
declines in HIV-infection levels. HIV prevention aimed at sex workers and 
their clients has played a large role in these achievements, discouraging risky 
sexual behavior, making condoms more widely available, and providing 
efficient testing and treatment centers. 
In contrast, Indonesia (along with Vietnam) shows a significant increase in 
HIV prevalence. The number of people infected with HIV in Jakarta alone 
reached 3,761 in October 2008, with an estimated 25,000 unreported cases. 
The figure stood at 3,486 for the same period in 2007. HIV cases were also 
increasing in Bali1 , Eastern Indonesia (Nusa Tenggara Barat and Nusa 
Tenggara Timur)2  as well as Papua.
Indonesia’s multi-faceted response to AIDS: 
Administrative red tape, Inertia of political Leaders, 
Discrimination of patients, Subversion of donor money*
•  The following special feature was provided by Michael Buehler, Postdoctoral Fellow in 
 Modern Southeast Asian Studies at Columbia University in New York. He can be reached 
 at mb3120@columbia.edu. His article on how  corruption and administrative 
 incompetence in Indonesia’s health sector affect people living with HIV in Jakarta is 
 available at: http://www.insideindonesia.org/content/view/1150/47/
1  Putu Ayu Utami Dewi. 2009. Empowering People with HIV through Support Groups in 
 Bali. Bali: JCAAP.
2  Linda Rae Bennet, Sari Andajani, Iko Safika. 2009. Women’s Vulnerability to HIV/AIDS 
 in Eastern Indonesia: Deficiencies in Information, Power and Policy. Bali: JCAAP.
HIV/AIDS epidemic on the rise in Indonesia
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While some experts predict that Asia may eventually overtake Africa as the 
part of the world with the highest number of people living with HIV/AIDS, 
others argue that the epidemics in Southeast Asia are on a different trajectory. 
In African countries HIV/AIDS has become prevalent among all sections 
of society, while in Asia it mainly occurs among members of ‘most-at-risk’ 
populations such as Injecting Drug Users (IDUs) or sex workers. 
Injecting drug use has been responsible for most of HIV-infections amongst 
men in most parts of Indonesia, while sexual transmission was the main risk 
factor among women.
However, recent developments seem to be pointing in another direction. 
There are indications that the HIV/AIDS epidemic is no longer confined to 
IDUs and female sex workers (FSW) but has started to make inroads into 
other parts of society. While the HIV epidemic initially clustered largely 
among IDUs, many non-injecting sex partners, prisoners, and clients of sex 
workers have become infected in recent years. New studies also suggest that 
HIV/AIDS infections are growing rapidly amongst Indonesia’s elderly3, 
as well as amongst young people4, women and children. Recent UNICEF 
statistics offer the rough estimation that there are somewhere between 3,300 
and 5,300 pregnant women living with HIV across the archipelago. Some of 
these sub-epidemics occurred entirely outside previous ‘most-at-risk’ groups. 
Since the outbreak of the epidemic in the country two decades ago, the 
Indonesian government has largely failed to prevent the transmission of HIV/
AIDS through the promotion of safe sex practices including use of condoms, 
harm reduction among IDUs as well as the provision of easy access to blood 
testing for the population overall. 
 • Lack of political will to promote condom use
  The Government of Indonesia has failed to establish an infrastructure 
  where ordinary Indonesians could obtain condoms at low costs. 
  Currently, there are 25 automatic condom dispensers installed across 
  the entire archipelago. While Indonesia is still a step ahead of 
  neighboring Malaysia, which does not have a single condom vending 
  
HIV/AIDS no longer confined to ‘most-at-risk’ groups in 
Indonesia?
Government inertia and incompetence major reason for 
spreading epidemic
3  Indah Mahdi, Hepa Susami, Samsuridjal Djauzi, Sari Arumdati. 2009. Characteristic 
 HIV/AIDS and Elderly in Cipto Mangunkusumo Hospital and Dharmais Cancer 
 Hospital. Bali: JCAAP. 
4  Romadhon Yunianto. 2009. Youth Speak Up! Building a Collective Voice and Sustainable 
 HIV/AIDS Peer Education Network. Bali: JCAAP.
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  machine, the situation is bleak compared to Thailand. In a country 
  that boasts a quarter of Indonesia’s population, authorities had 
  installed 9,730 condom vending machines through 2008, focusing 
  on hotels, dormitories, hospitals, health centers, department stores and 
  cinemas. This triggered an increase of condom use in Thailand.7
  
  In Indonesia it appears that the government feared a political backlash 
  if it installed condom machines, particularly in places where they 
  would be of use such as red light districts, karaoke bars and massage 
  parlors. 
  Many religious leaders and politicians continue to deny the 
  realities of Indonesia’s sexual landscape. In 2006, for example, the 
  influential Indonesia Ulama Council (MUI) tried to ban condom 
  machines. While this may be the efforts of a few hardliners only, the 
  fact is that most mainstream figures of Indonesia’s religious and 
  political establishment continue to reject the promotion of condom 
  use.  Aburizal Bakrie, Coordinating Minister for Social Welfare, 
  stated during a conference held for World Aids Day in December 
  2008, that condoms were only for those who sin outside the confines 
  of traditional marriage.10 In April 2009, the city administration of 
  Jakarta refused to use the term ‘condom’ in a new local by-law, instead 
  using the term ‘prevention device’.
  Many Indonesian leaders believe that harm-minimization policies 
  would ultimately be regarded as promoting immoral policies. The 
  standard argument against condom campaigns in prisons is that this 
  would foster homosexuality or that setting up condom machines 
  in red light districts could be seen as legitimizing prostitution. 
  Indonesian politicians’ timid approach to promoting safe sex can be 
  well summarized by a quote from Elisabeth Pisani, an HIV/AIDS 
  activist in Indonesia. In a country were more than 10 million ordinary 
  Indonesian men are frequently visiting prostitutes according to 
  government estimates, ‘[c]alling your voters hypocrites does not play 
  well at the polls’ as Pisani, points out. 11
  It is this lack of political will that accounts for the fact that the 
  Indonesian government refuses to work together with the sex industry 
  in the fight against HIV/AIDS. 12  The failure to promote condom 
  use accounts for the fact that less than two percent of Indonesian men 
  
7  Cheewanan Lertpiriyasuwat, Sombat Thanprasertsuk, Nutchanart Kaeodumkoeng Vinida 
 Chawanangkoon. 2009. Access to Condom through Condom Vending Machine in 
 Thailand: Development and Community Participation. Bali: JCAAP.
10 Katie Hamman. 2008. Social Taboos Spur AIDS in Indonesia. Available at http://www.
 thenational.ae/article/20081205/FOREIGN/908295822/1002
11  Elisabeth Pisani. 2008. The Wisdom of Whores: Bureaucrats, Brothels and the Business of 
 AIDS. New York: Norton Company Inc. Available at http://www.wisdomofwhores.com/
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use condoms. Likewise, (or maybe consequently), most Indonesian 
FSW do not engage in safe sex practices. The frequency of condom 
use amongst Jakarta’s estimated 10,000 FSW was still very low in 
2009.14  Consequently local HIV/AIDS epidemics continue to grow 
among most-at-risk-groups.15
Against this backdrop, it is of no surprise that the National Aids
Commission released figures in December 2008 that suggested 
that unsafe sex will soon be the leading cause of HIV infections across 
the archipelago. Overall, 46 percent of new infections in 2008 resulted 
from unprotected sex, a figure that rises up to 94 percent in the 
province of Papua.
The Indonesian government’s approach to promoting harm-reduction 
practices among other ‘most-at-risk’ populations is characterized by 
incompetence and counterproductive policies. This is most visible in 
relation to  injecting drug users. 
Various government campaigns have virtually demonized drug 
users in recent years (see poster beside),  and draconian drug laws 
foster discrimination against drug users. Law No. 5/1997 on 
Psychotropics and Law No. 22/1997 on Narcotics both criminalize 
drug consumption. Article 78 of the Narcotics law, for example, makes 
almost no distinction between drug users and drug dealers. A surge in 
funding for law enforcement in recent years, partially paid for by 
foreign donors promoting ‘good governance’, has provided the 
Yudohoyno administration with the financial means to enforce these 
laws and take a hardline approach on drugs. “The policy on drugs is 
much harsher right now than 10 years ago. Former president 
Abdurrahman Wahid’s drug user policy put it as a social issue but since 
Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, drugs have been put on the level of 
security,” Asmin Fransiska, Law Lecturer at Atma Jaya University, said 
in a recent interview. 
Yudhoyono’s ‘war against drugs’ is responsible for an HIV/AIDS 
explosion in Indonesian prisons. The immediate consequence of 
  
12 I Dewo Nyoman Suyetna. 2009. Contractual Agreement between ‘Pimps’, Government, 
 as Strategy for 100% Condom Use in Bali. Bali: JCAAP. 
14  Naomi Esteria Tobing. 2009. Condom Use among Female Sex Workers. Bali: JCAAP.
15   James Sinaya, Robert Magnani, Adi Purwanto, H.M. Fauzi, Tri Ghozalli, Tijam 
 Prayitno. 2009. Mobilizing the Community to Address HIV/AIDS among Most-At-Risk-
 Groups in Malang District, East Java. Bali: JCAAP. Zahroh Shaluhiyah, Antono 
 Suryoputro. 2009. Young Gay Men Sexual Relationships: A Contextual Understanding of 
 Sexual Risks and HIV/ AIDS Prevention. Bali: JCAAP.
Discriminatory laws cripple harm reduction efforts for 
drug users
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treating drug users with the same harsh punishments as dealers is the 
flooding of Indonesia’s prison system with HIV positive inmates. 
Of the roughly 12,000 people locked up in the capital’s prisons in 
2009, almost 6,900 were imprisoned for substance abuse. Most prisons 
provide no health services at all, forcing inmates to engage in practices 
that carry a high risk of HIV transmission.16 The going rate for a used 
needle in a Jakarta prison is said to be Rp 2,000 Rp (US$.20) per shot. 
Similar to the argument that promoting condom use will encourage 
immoral behavior like extramarital affairs, the standard argument of 
Indonesian politicians is that if the state provides clean needles, it is 
promoting injecting drugs. The effects of such an approach are evident. 
Many inmates acquire HIV/AIDS soon after their imprisonment. 
Statistics from May 2009 reveal that a third of prison deaths recorded 
were due to HIV/AIDS.
The situation is equally bleak when looking at harm-reduction strategies 
for IDUs not locked up in detention facilities. The fear of discrimination 
and government harassment is one of the main reasons why only a very 
low number of IDUs access health facilities. The Ministry of Health 
(MoH) estimated in 2006 that there were more than 33,000 IDUs in 
Jakarta alone, 51 percent of whom were HIV positive. Various NGOs 
started programs to encourage drug users to return used needles and 
syringes as far back as 2003. As part of their efforts, more than 50 
sites scattered throughout the capital were provided with needles and 
syringes in 2008. But only a third were returned because most drug users 
reported that they feared being caught by the police when returning 
needles and picking up new ones.17  
The pattern holds true for the rest of Java. Of the 26,000 estimated IDUs 
living in East Java province, only a small number were said to access 
health services due to a lack of information, stigma and discrimination 
Most IDUs were also concerned about police harassment.19
No doubt, there are some success stories. Family Health International, 
a public health and development organization, established a project 
together with the MoH and 18 NGOs in 31 districts and cities across 
Indonesia, including 37 prisons. By promoting safe injecting practices 
they greatly reduced the incidence of needle sharing and there is 
evidence that this has reduced the rate of HIV infection amongst 
newer drug users.
16 Puput Nugroho, Bahrul Ulum, Dr. Mohammad Adib Solahuddin. 2009. Preventing 
 HIV Infection among Prisoners in Malang City. Bali: JCAAP. 
17  Lamganda Sihombing. 2009. Managing used Needle to prevent Needle Injuries among 
 Injecting Drug Users and People in Communities. Bali: JCAAP.
19   James Rowan Blogg. Inang Winarso, Amala Rahmah, Patri Handoyo. 2009. How to 
 Improve Quality of HIV Harm Reduction Services? A Needs Assessment of Injecting Drug
  Users in 7 Cities in Java. Bali: JCAAP.
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However, the overall situation remains dismal. Programs are often 
not very effective due to the low capacity of the Indonesian state 
apparatus due to endemic corruption and red-tape. A survey in 2002 
showed that government outreach programs were largely ineffective, 
reaching around 20 percent of drug users in Indonesian cities.21 
In short, the lack of political will and counterproductive policies 
are responsible for the failings of ‘harm-reduction’ programs. While 
there are, no doubt, progressive political leaders such as Tarmizi 
Taher, Religious Affairs Minister between 1993 and 1998, who 
supported the establishment of methadone clinics and needle 
exchange programs for drug users as a means to contain HIV-
transmission, the majority of Indonesia’s religious and political 
leaders is not interested in promoting policies that lead to harm 
reduction in populations most at risk of acquiring HIV/AIDS. A 
2009 survey among five major Indonesian parties showed that none 
of the parties had incorporated HIV/AIDS prevention in their 
health platforms nor did they have concrete policy plans to address 
the issue.23
While there is a global trend towards softening the approach to drug 
users, a development many countries in Southeast Asia have taken 
up—reports from Vietnam, for example, suggest that the country’s 
police has changed its approach, no longer targeting people carrying 
condoms, starting to focus on drug dealers rather than criminalizing 
drug consumption and encouraging drug users to participate 
in needle distribution programs24—Indonesia decided to take a 
different path.
This situation is likely to get worse in the future. The newly 
elected Indonesian parliament will soon be discussing harsh and 
counterproductive amendments to the current drug laws. These 
amendments would, for example, increase the maximum penalty for 
possession of one gram of heroin from 15 years in prison to death. 
The amendment would also upgrade the criminal status of drug users, 
increasing the maximum amount of hours a drug user can be detained 
from 24 hours to 72 hours or making it a crime if  one does not report 
drug users in the neighborhood. Overall, the amendments would 
21 Rizky Ika Syafitri, Ignatius Praptoraharjo, Nasrun Hadi, Octavery Kamil, Theo 
 Zaenoeri, Ade Aulia Erwin. 2009. Application of a Coupon Scheme to Reach New 
 Injection Drug Users (IDUs) into HIV Interventions  Bali: JCAAP. 
23 Ois Sriyani. 2009. Policy of Political Parties in Prevention of HIV-AIDS in Jakarta. Bali: 
 JCAAP.
24 PengFei Zhao, Ngyuen Danh Lam, Lai Kim Anh, Nguyen Thi Huynh, Nguyen Thi 
 Minh Tam, Nguyen Thien Nha, David Jacka, Masami Fujita, Ngyuen Thanh Long. 
 2009. High Coverage of Condom Use and Increased Distribution of Needle& Syringe in 
 Can Tho, Vietnam. Bali: JCAAP.
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provide police with new powers to place drug users in overcrowded 
prisons, were they are most likely to become  infected with HIV/
AIDS.If the amendment is passed it will most certainly fuel the spiral 
of HIV-transmission in Indonesia.
Indonesians are usually diagnosed with HIV/AIDS at a stage when 
immunosuppression is already far advanced. In a recent report, the 
MoH estimated that there are currently 4000 people living with 
HIV in Bali, 50 percent of whom learned of their status only after 
falling ill or being hospitalized.26  In fact, many patients have already 
progressed to AIDS when first diagnosed27 and many will never 
know that they are HIV positive. 
Screening and earlier treatment of HIV would result not only in 
improved survival rates but also in reduced HIV-transmission 
to others.28 Many women in Indonesia discover their status only 
after their husband or partner becomes seriously ill or dies.29 Many 
children are born with HIV because their mothers did not know 
that they were HIV-positive while pregnant.   
A combination of factors explains why the uptake of HIV-testing in 
Indonesia is very low. These include lack of knowledge, distance to 
health facilities, transportation costs and a mind-set among many 
Indonesians that one should only consult a doctor when feeling 
ill. Indonesia’s health system is plagued by underfunding, a lack of 
qualified staff, rising medical costs and outdated equipment and 
above all by bureaucratic hurdles and red tape. This all has an impact 
on people’s willingness to check their HIV-status. In a system where 
extortion of money from patients goes unpunished and in which 
corruption is the norm, it is understandable that HIV Counseling 
and Testing is generally low and that most Indonesians shy away 
from getting regular health tests. 
Despite the Indonesian government’s claim that it is a lack of knowledge 
amongst drug users that keeps them away from HIV testing centers, 
26 Putu Ayu Utami Dewi. 2009. Empowering People with HIV through Support Groups in 
 Bali. Bali: JCAAP.
27  Zahrotur Rusdya Hinduan, Nirmala Kesumah, Reinout van Crevel. Harm Hospers. 
 2009. Characteristics of Subjects Counseled and Tested for HIV in an Indonesian 
 Hospital: Seroprevalence. Bali: JCAAP.
28  Reinout van Crevel. Hinta Meijerink, Rudi Wisaksana, Sena Sopaheluwaka. 2009. A 
 Model on Natural Decline of CD4-Cells and reduced Mortality through HIV-Screening 
 in Indonesia. Bali; JCAAP.
29 Erna Herawati, Irma Anintya Tasya, Diba AEP Basar, Lucas Pinxten. 2009. HIV, 
 Sexuality and Disclosure: An In-Depth Interview Among HIV-Infected Couples. Bali; 
 JCAAP.
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recent survey results from the city of  Bandung show that drug users 
were actually well informed about opportunities to get medical 
treatment. But they stayed away from hospitals because of inefficient 
procedures at HIV testing facilities, high costs, and above all, 
discrimination by health sector personnel and lack of confidentiality.
While most observers of Indonesia’s approach to tackling the 
exploding HIV/AIDS epidemic agree that the government has 
failed on the prevention side (the cheap and easy part), until recently 
the verdict was still out on the performance of the Indonesian 
government regarding the treatment of people living with HIV/
AIDS. 
Antiretroviral (ARV) drugs have become the global cornerstone 
of HIV care and treatment. ARV medicines can suppress the 
replication of HIV and dramatically reduce the amount of the virus 
in a person’s system, restoring immunity and greatly prolonging 
life and good health. ARV treatment also reduces the possibility of 
transmission from people living with HIV to others. Finally, ARV 
treatment can lower mother-to-child-HIV-transmission down to 
around 2 percent. 
The Indonesian government, in cooperation with foreign donors, 
has increased ARV programs in the last few years, but, estimates 
suggest that only a lucky few receive treatment. In 2008, only 
around 10 percent of the 270,000 people living with HIV were 
on ARV treatment, according to a report of the MoH. In 2007, 
only 2 percent of the overall number of Indonesian women known 
to be HIV-positive received ARV treatment. This is in stark 
contrast to other Southeast Asian countries. In 2008, the national 
coverage in the region was 20 percent on average. Cambodia, 
Laos and Thailand, the ‘best performers’ in the region, all reached 
over 60 percent of ARV coverage, according to a recent UNAIDS 
report.32
Indonesia’s ARV drug distribution system has been marred by 
problems. Theoretically, ARV therapies and blood tests are free, but 
corruption prevents the system from working in practice. Doctors 
overprescribe medication, getting rewards and kick-backs from 
pharmaceutical companies, while hospital staff ask for bribes to 
speed up administrative procedures. 
32 Marwaan Macan-Markar. 2008. South-East Asia: Record Gain in Antiretroviral 
 Coverage. Bangkok: Interpress Service. Available at http://www.aegis.com/news/
 ips/2008/IP080711.html
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A recent study on obstacles for getting treatment in West Sumatra 
shows how the hidden costs of Indonesian’s health system prevent 
people living with HIV/AIDS from getting treatment. Ideally, 
ARV therapy is monitored by regular blood tests to monitor a HIV-
positive person’s immune system and the progress of ARV therapy. 
But the West Sumatra survey revealed that 80 percent of those 
surveyed could not afford CD4 blood tests, despite the fact that it is 
supposed to be for free.33
Even for those who can afford the bribes and exorbitant doctor’s fees, 
challenges to get ARV medication are plentiful. ARV medications 
in Indonesia are not available in pharmacies upon presenting a 
prescription by a doctor. Instead, ARV medications have to be 
collected in specially assigned government hospitals. 
Once ARV treatment begins, it is vital that there are no interruptions to 
the therapy, otherwise resistance to ARV will develop forcing patients 
to take more expensive second-line pills. Unfortunately, the ARV 
distribution system in Indonesia has suffered from supply problems 
and shortages. Imported ARVs are often stuck in government custody 
for months at a time, exacerbating existing supply issues.
Consequently, thousands of Indonesians living with HIV are now 
forced to return to hospital several times a month, if not a week, to 
see if the medication they need has arrived. Many patients are also 
forced to abandon treatment, sometimes for months at a time, while 
waiting for more stocks to arrive. 
Additionally, many of the counseling and information services 
provided by the referral hospitals are inadequate and people trying to 
receive treatment are given the wrong information. According a 2007 
Ministry of Health report, only 59.5 percent of the people taking 
ARVs received counseling on a regular basis. This has led to some 
people taking their medication incorrectly with others dropping out 
of treatment completely. “It is actually not HIV that kills us but the 
hospital administration,” an Indonesian woman living with HIV told 
the Report under conditions of anonymity.
People with HIV/AIDS are more infectious without proper ARV 
therapy than if given proper care and they die from the infection. In 
the last year in Jakarta, the number of deaths due to AIDS-related 
illnesses has risen from 17 percent to 20 percent. A high-ranking 
33 Hendry Salfriandi. 2009. Government Commitment: Role of Leaders to Increase Access 
 for Quality PLWHIV in West Sumatra. Bali: JCAAP.
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official at the Sub-Directorate AIDS at the Ministry of Health, 
speaking to the Report under conditions of anonymity, claimed that 
this increase was mainly caused by the frequent stock-outs in the 
capital’s hospitals. After years of setting up a distribution system for 
ARV medication, the Indonesian government cannot assure ARV 
treatment in the big, well-funded, teaching hospitals in Jakarta, let 
alone in other parts of Java or Outer Island Indonesia.
Meanwhile, the Indonesian government, especially the MoH, 
is busy engaging in far-from transparent activities with funds 
obtained from foreign donor agencies. Indonesian health officials, 
for example, have pushed for years to establish a local production 
industry for HIV/AIDS medications, arguing that the country 
has to strive for ARV self-sufficiency. While not much is known 
about the composition of locally produced medication—ARV 
generics re-packaged by Kimia Farma, a state-owned pharmaceutical 
company, do not fulfill the World Health Organization’s pre-
qualification standards— it is clear that producing ARV medication 
locally is an expensive option that seems to mainly increase the 
financial burden on the health infrastructure for Indonesians living 
with HIV/AIDS. 
Costs for a bottle of Kimia Farma produced AZT/3TC pills, 
currently the standard therapy in Indonesia, was Rp 170,000 Rp 
(US$ 17.00), while UNICEF provided AZT/3TC pills amounted 
to costs of Rp126,000 (US$ 12.60) per bottle, according to official 
data the Report obtained from the MoH. Kimia Farma products of 
importance to HIV/AIDS patients are also high. The Kimia Farma 
generic for Fluconazole, for example, an antifungal drug used in 
the treatment and prevention of superficial and systemic fungal 
infections, is 10 times as high as the generic version available in 
Thailand. While the Indonesian state slaps a 30%-40% import tax 
on ingrediences needed to produce ARVs and other medications 
in Indonesia, the high prices are undoubtedly also a result of rent-
seeking.
There is neither oversight over the production of Kimia Farma nor 
an incentives structure to produce cost-effectively. Kimia Farma is 
one of those state-owned companies providing opportunities to 
former state officials to fill their pockets for many more years after 
retirement. Of the current six members of the board (komisaris) of 
Kimia Farma, two are former military figures (Efendi Rangkuti and 
Dr Darmansyah) and one is a retiree from the Ministry of Health 
(Dr Syafii Ahmad). Corruption and rent-seeking in the close 
relationship between the MoH and Kimia Farma was made quite 
apparent by the arrest of former Health Minister Ahmad Sujudi on 
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22 August 2009 on charges of kick-backs for providing government 
contracts to Kimia Farma. Already in March 2009, the Corruption 
Eradication Commission had requested the Justice Ministry to 
block not only Sujudi from leaving the country, but to extend a 
travel ban request for Achmad Hardiman, Former Director General 
for Medical Services at the MoH, Sri Astuti, Director General for 
Medical Services at the MoH, and two former directors of Kimia 
Farma, Gunawan Pranoto and Suharno. 
To sum up, Indonesia has failed in its prevention strategy while its 
treatment efforts are characterized by inefficiency, frequently out of 
stock medications, and medications sold at above-market prices due 
predatory taxes, corruption and rent-seeking. So far, the Indonesian 
government has pocketed in more than US$400 million of foreign 
money to deal with HIV/AIDS, paid mostly by North American 
and European tax payers. Another US$ 130 will soon be made 
available through the Global Fund. The costs of the damage done to 
the Indonesian population can only be imagined. p
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Following the 17 July bombings in Mega Kuningan, the 
Executive Network (TEN) invited a panel of experts 
on issues of security and terrorism to discuss the current 
situation.
The discussion began with Nick Duder, the president 
director of Hill & Associates in Indonesia, and currently 
head of the Risk Reporting Practice. Duder presented 
security advice for businesses and individuals.
Sidney Jones, senior adviser for the International Crisis 
Group’s Asia program, discussed current information 
regarding the attacks on 17 July, including recruitment 
techniques and networks of the suspected mastermind , 
Noordin M. Top.
Noor Huda Ismael is executive 
director of the International 
Institute for Peacebuilding and 
graduate of the Al Mukmin 
school in Ngruki, where he 
shared a room with one of 
the first Bali bombers. Huda 
published a prescient feature 
in the June 2, 2009 Report 
in which he warned of the continuing danger posed by 
Jemaah Islamiyah ( JI) splinter groups. Huda discussed 
aspects of the bombing that point to an evolution in 
tactics used by the bombers and indicate that Noordin’s 
network is wider than was previously believed. 
Minister of Defense Juwono Sudarsono gave the final 
remarks before the panel took questions from TEN guests. 
Minister Juwono stressed the importance of improving 
social welfare and combating corruption in the fight 
against terrorism. 
Nick Duder:  My brief today is on the impact of the 
Marriot and Ritz Carlton bombings on corporations 
and individuals and how they can respond.  My client 
concerns predominantly focus around a number of key 
issues.  Such as:  Are their corporations a target? How 
can they protect their businesses and their people, assets, 
reputations? What is the possible impact on customers 
who no longer want to attend their premises and on the 
security of dependents, especially of expatriates who 
aren’t familiar with the city.
The answer to all those concerns is having both proactive 
measures in place to prevent becoming a victim: lowering 
your profile.  The other way is more reactive measures that 
include business planning and continuity planning.
Let’s look at protection of businesses. Essentially, being 
informed is critical. You must understand what is 
happening in the environment through the media and 
from organisations that put out daily advisories or look 
at specific issues.
On the other hand, you have 
to be very careful about the 
information. There were some 
SMSs going around that 
caused consternation in the 
community and resulted in 
people moving out of hotels. 
Information about risk has 
to be managed. If you are 
receiving information, it is better to triangulate it with 
other sources so you’re not overly dependent on one. 
The next step is staying alert and security awareness. 
This is usually done by means of briefing and trainings 
for both expatriate and national staff.  We often are 
provided with lists of potential targets. What you have 
to do is take it upon yourself and decide for yourself 
whether you want to go to some of these events and 
venues. Lowering your profile is just being sensible. 
As for reactive measures, currently we are tasked to 
look at measures in offices, hotels and residences. 
This is certainly the first line of defense, not just 
the physical measures but procedural measures. 
Security personnel must understand their roles and 
responsibilities and understand how to use their 
equipment. Businesses should control who has access. 
Van Zorge Report      August 31, 2009 
2
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and they want, in 
their words, for 
Western nations 
to tremble.”
on speed dial, to their spouse and to relevant contacts 
who may be able to assist them in an emergency. Have 
preferred hospitals identified, and keep regular contact 
with embassies.  Many expatriates are part of warden 
systems. Make sure you’re a part of those and that 
you’re being contacted and are participating in them. 
Schools are another area of concern. Many schools are 
proactive and have good measures in place, but people 
are most vulnerable at entrance and exit points to the 
schools where traffic can get built up. So the schools 
may be well protected but you may be vulnerable 
somewhere else and you need to try to manage that as 
best you can. 
Sidney Jones:  I’ll go through a bit about what we do 
and don’t know about Noordin and his group. No one 
knows with any exactitude how big Noordin’s network 
actually is. He broke away from JI in 2003-2004 and 
he’s been able to recruit from different groups that 
have different geographical bases in Central and East 
Java.  He has also drawn routinely from a faction of 
Darul Islam in the Banten 
area known as Ring Banten, 
a group of about 200 people. 
This is the group that he drew 
on as field operatives for the 
Australian Embassy bombing 
and the first Bali bombing 
by Mukhlas Samudra. I don’t 
think that all 200 members 
of that group who would be 
interested in taking part [in 
his operations], but what he can do is recruit from a 
variety of different malcontents and Ring Banten is 
certainly one.
For every operation Noordin has undertaken, he has 
been able to specifically recruit people. This looks like 
what happened with Dani, the 18-year-old [suicide 
bomber in the 17 July attack]. There are new people 
who come into the network within 4-5 months of their 
initial contact with the group. Every person who gets 
recruited, gets recruited through direct face to face 
interaction with someone from within that network. 
There’s a lot of talk about self-radicalization over the 
This was highlighted with the recent attack at the 
hotels. It is important to know who you have in your 
organization and who are your suppliers and vendors, 
who are being allowed entry into your organization. 
Moving on to emergency response plans. Many 
companies often have safety places for building 
evacuations and fires. These need to be constantly 
reviewed, updated and rehearsed. Businesses need to 
make sure that their own building management has 
these procedures and you need to feel comfortable with 
them and feel that they are complimentary to your own 
procedures and that they are rehearsed.
On the more reactive side, if something were to occur, 
you need to be able to get back up to speed with 
minimum damage in terms of revenue, personnel, and 
reputation. This is where your emergency response plans 
come into place. Having a crisis management team who 
can manage such an event, having a location where you 
can manage the incident and also having emergency 
response plans for each likely eventuality. Historically, 
many organisations have these 
but they just sit on shelves, so 
they need to be rehearsed and 
practiced . 
I remember in 1998, there 
were mass evacuations from 
the country. It was the 
companies that had plans 
that were able to time their 
departure appropriately so 
that they were not caught on airport roads. Their 
procedures had been rehearsed so it was almost routine 
for them.  Whereas for those companies who didn’t, 
there was panic, people got caught up in the wrong 
place at the wrong time. 
In terms of security of dependents, if you’re part of a 
corporation you are sitting in offices with good security, 
while the most vulnerable are often your spouse and your 
children who are often out and about in the city. 
They should be reporting in on their movements, and 
keeping in regular contact, having emergency numbers 





has experts in sharp 
shooting among 
its members.”
internet. There’s no tradition of that here: it doesn’t 
happen. People are directly in contact with people who 
are already active in one of these networks.
If you look at the sophistication and coordination 
of both the hotel bombings with this plan to attack 
Cikeas— and there’s a lot we still don’t know about 
that second plot— you’re dealing with a minimum of 
20 people. Getting the financing, doing the surveillance, 
doing the logistics, renting the supplies, renting the 
house and so on, this is not just a small group of four 
or five people. 
In terms of the financing, with 
this kind of coordination and 
sophistication,  there had to 
be money from outside the 
group. We don’t know if it 
was from inside or outside 
Indonesia but this looks like 
it can’t just be the group itself 
raising funds through armed 
robberies. Finding the money 
trail and understanding how it 
works is going to be a critical 
part of this investigation.  
This also has implications because Noordin calls 
himself Al Qaeda Indonesia. If it turns out that there 
was any outside funding in this, it means that if 
Noordin was arrested, or even if his whole inner circle 
is arrested, and taken out of circulation, those outside 
donors could be looking for new partners in Indonesia 
and there are other partners to work with. So knowing 
where the money is coming from is critical.
In terms of targets, it’s quite interesting that Noordin 
very much follows at one level the Al Qaeda fatwa from 
February 1998 which urges all Muslims to make war on 
America and its allies however, whenever, and wherever 
possible. And that means that in their thinking it’s not 
just symbolic landmarks with an American or Western 
name but it’s also civilians and the military who are 
paying taxes and who are funding the war machine 
and who, in their view, is  killing Muslims in Iraq, 
Afghanistan, Palestine and so on. 
There’s a lot of literature that Noordin or people 
around Noordin have written or translated from the 
Arabic about the hegemonic control of the business 
community. So it’s clear that in their thinking, the 
business community is persecuting Muslims around the 
world. This came up in the second Bali bombings when 
the planners said they wanted to go to Jimbaran, and 
not Kuta, because it was more likely to have members 
of the foreign business community in Jimbaran, not just 
young tourists, and their deaths were believed to have a 
larger impact. 
Another thing the planners 
of the second Bali bombing 
said was that the only two 
places really worth attacking 
in Indonesia were Jakarta 
and Bali because those are 
the only two places with 
international media coverage. 
They want attention and 
they want, in their words, for 
Western nations to tremble. 
They are proud of their 
ability to cause fear, and they 
write about this notion of causing fear as one of their 
goals.
Another target that hasn’t gotten much attention is 
the taghut which is used to describe Muslims who 
have somehow betray the faith by allying with enemies 
of Islam.  If SBY or any other government official 
is seen as pro-Western or sympathetic to Americans 
or Australians  they can immediately be put in the 
taghut category.  There’s also been some suggestion 
that SBY might have become a target in retaliation 
for the execution of the Bali bombers . The group in 
Palembang arrested in August 2008 were discussing, 
but never got around to planning, the bombing of 
the Supreme Court in retaliation for the [execution 
of the] Bali bombers. So we’ve had various discussions 
in the radical community of carrying out attacks 
against taghut. We’ve heard of discussions of targeting 
Megawati, once when she was president and once 
when she was vice president. So the idea of attacking 
an Indonesian official is not new.
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One of the big issues for many people is why Noordin 
has not been caught when he’s been at large in 
Indonesia now for seven years. He came to Indonesia 
in early 2002 and he has been on the run ever since 
from the Malaysian government and, since the first 
Marriott bomb, from the Indonesian government. 
In addition to the numbers of people in his network, 
which if you’re just considering plans for things we’ve 
seen thus far, we’re talking maybe twenty people, the 
network has got to be larger than that, so maybe at a 
minimum 30-40.  
Then there’s a network of supporters around him 
who will not turn him in, who provide assistance like 
accommodation even when they don’t agree with 
what he’s doing.  The strongest network is schools 
affiliated to JI where some teachers recruit students 
through extra curricular activities. There’s nothing the 
government could do or should do to shut down these 
schools because there’s nothing criminal going on 
inside them. If you look at the 
pattern of who takes part in 
these activities, over and over 
again you get schools within 
this network of 50 coming up. 
Figuring out a way to address 
the problem of these schools 
in critical. This is a population 
potentially vulnerable to 
recruitment and a place where 
extremists have shelter. It 
takes just one person visiting 
a school for a period of two 
weeks to recruit someone new. 
We saw this in Palembang. 
The director of the school was opposed to Noordin-
style of violence, but he had two visitors that he put up 
because they were being hunted by the police. Those 
two visitors in a relatively short period of time were 
able to radicalize some of the others in the school. 
Figuring out who should be responsible for these 
schools, what kind of programs of engagement you can 
undertake to draw out some of the student population 
into other more constructive activities is something 
that has got to be thought through.  If we don’t address 
it, we are going to see another generation of potential 
leaders coming out of these schools.  
While we’ve had mostly bombings in Jakarta and Bali 
thus far, you should remember that in Poso in Central 
Sulawesi, which was a vital recruiting area for JI and 
several other radical groups, targeted assassinations 
were common.  They targeted informers, and their 
 local enemies: Christian priests, police officials, and 
others. Because no foreigners were killed, except 
for one Italian tourist in August 2003, nobody 
paid attention to that as a method. But this group 
understands that method, has experts in sharp shooting 
among its members, and that shouldn’t be discounted 
as something that may be used, even if it hasn’t been 
used in Jakarta or Bali.
Noor Huda Ismael: I found several aspects of the 
recent bombings disturbing.  First, they were employing 
sleeper cells who were waiting 
for the right moment to 
deploy. Also, in the past, what 
was usually used was a truck 
from outside and now they 
use someone inside despite all 
the surveillance.
The third thing is that we 
learned new names that we 
had never heard before. The 
guy named Ibrohim, who is 
he? This suggests that Noordin 
Top’s network is larger than we 
had assumed in the past. There 
is evidence that Noordin has 
managed to transfer his recruitment skill so he doesn’t 
need to do recruitment himself. He can just ask someone 
else to do it and then he can just apply the finishing 
touches. 
A friend of mine shared the same mosque as one of the 
suicide bombers.  He talked with him and considered 
him to be a very nice individual. Within two months, 
he left without any news. My friend was shocked 
to learn that the man who used to sit by him in the 
Van Zorge Report      August 31, 2009 
2
terror. The territorial command was instrumental in 
successfully anticipating acts of terror by groups from 
the extreme right and extreme left in the past. 
Now in our democracy with accountability and rule of 
law, we have yielded the role to  civil authorities. The 
police, the attorney general’s office, and the courts are 
point lead agencies to deal with acts of terrorism. 
Underlying all of this are the roots causes that lead these 
young men to acts of violence. One is the inequity of 
development.  Not every young man in this country 
will have the opportunity and skills to thrive in this era 
of instant globalization and instant deprivation. If you 
don’t have the skill, then you won’t be able to make it 
which is one of the reasons why in these cases, you can 
see that it is desperation, poverty, marginalization, social, 
economic and cultural that makes them attracted to 
these handlers.
The second cause is the corruption in the public office 
and private sector that tends to exacerbate the notion of 
relative deprivation in these young people, particularly 
if they are at the fringe of society and have no chance 
within their lifetime of making it up the social and 
economic ladder.  Poverty by itself does not ultimately 
lead to people resorting to violence, but poverty among 
Muslim youth can be a justification used by extremist 
groups to act on their behalf and to attract some of 
them.
Sidney Jones asks Minister Juwono about the role of 
Kopassus in the anti-terror efforts.
Minister Juwono: Kopassus has a problem of image 
which of course concerns the President especially 
now that his brother-in-law is the head of Kopassus. 
The president has been very careful in limiting the 
role of Kopassus. The president has been careful to 
put the civil authorities in the forefront in the war
against terror. 
On the other hand, the last five days have shown 
the danger of the president being the target of an 
Questions from the floor
mosque was actually one of the suicide bombers. In 
only two months, this individual was transformed into 
a suicide bomber. 
How has Noordin evaded arrest?  First, he enjoys 
support from society, from those who believe that 
Noordin is a mujahideen, a fighter for Islam.  Also, in 
Islamic tradition, he is a guest, and in Islam, you have to 
respect the guest for at least three days. If not yourself, 
you must pass on the guest to someone else. That’s 
tradition. Noordin moves from location to location 
only through recommendation from his trusted 
members. He only chooses based on a recommendation 
and then cross-checks. Individuals close to Noordin can 
earn his trust by participating in any violent activities. 
Unreconciled jihadis who are released from prison can 
re-energize the movement.  There are some 200 who 
have been released but I don’t think they will all want 
to return to play in the game. The guy who was killed in 
the raid in Bekasi was actually arrested briefly and then 
released.  Because he was only kept for a short period 
of time, other members of the group wondered if he 
had not made a deal with the police. Then he couldn’t 
go back to the mainstream JI because he was tainted—
he had revealed the secrets of the organization to 
the police.  So he could no longer be a part of the 
mainstream JI or part of society.
Minister Juwono: My feeling after reading the reports 
of last night and this morning is that it’s sad that these 
young men fell into this state of despair. One of the 
concerns in the Ministry of Defense is to encompass 
the notion of social justice as part of our defense. 
That means we must consider the 33 million 
Indonesians who live on less than a dollar and half 
a day, those who are not employed, the 3 million of 
them who are mostly young Muslims who do not 
have the skills or opportunity to climb the social ladder 
and who are prone to be attracted to radical ideologies—
whether those ideolgies are secular or religious. 
We are now trying to recalibrate the role of the defense 
force, particularly of the army and special forces, who 
had been very successful in the past at anticipating 
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assassination plot, so perhaps it’s time the special forces 
took charge of security of the president, which is their 
discrete and proper role— by 
law the military is in charge of 
the president’s safety. 
H.S. Dillon asks about 
decentralized development and 
its relationship to poverty and 
terrorism.
Sidney Jones: I would take 
issue a bit with the idea that 
people are turning to these groups out of desperation 
and poverty because the bulk of the evidence suggests 
that that’s not the key factor. Even suicide bombers, the 
dispensable ones, can be middle class or lower middle 
class. The bomber at the Marriott hotel certainly wasn’t 
the poorest of the poor: he owned a Xerox kiosk. Of 
the three suicide bombers in the second Bali bombing, 
two were probably affected by poverty, but one had 
gone through a succession of  JI schools and was at least 
better educated than the other two.  
If you look at why people join these groups, there isn’t 
one explanation. It varies 
tremendously. If you look at 
who joined in Poso, they joined 
for clear reasons:  grievances, a 
sense of injustice, they had lost 
their relatives and didn’t believe 
there was fair prosecution, or 
they had lost their property. 
But that’s a very different 
group than those who were 
recruited from West Java and 
Central Java.  Even the people 
who were recruited in Central Java were recruited 
for different reasons, and very frequently, it’s family 
members drawing other family members in. In the end, 
family links may become more important than any 
economic factor. 
Zabantu Ngoobo, Counsellor of the Embassy of the 
Republic of South African:   Does the oxygen of publicity 
act as a trigger for terrorist acts?
Sidney Jones: I remember reading a deposition of one 
of the people arrested for his role in the Australian 
embassy bombing and he 
noted that the first time he 
was introduced to Noordin, 
Noordin came out of the 
room in the safe house and 
said, ‘Hi, see this headline,’ 
and he was holding with pride 
a paper that said something 
like ‘Noordin Top, Most 
Dangerous Man in Southeast 
Asia.’ To the extent that 
that kind of publicity feeds the legend of the elusive 
Noordin Mohammad Top, the sexier in some ways his 
role becomes. A deposition from the Palembang group 
had a man from Noordin’s network meeting with 
someone from Palembang and he said, ‘When you go 
back to Palembang, tell your members that you met 
Noordin because you’ll have greater credibility.’ So, I 
think the oxygen issue is right. 
I’ve worked in human rights all my life and defended 
freedom of expression all my life but there’s no right that 
the convicted Bali bombers be given access to the BBC 
and Al Jazeera. It’s perfectly 
within the capacity and the 
ability of the Indonesian 
government to say that’s one 
area where the press cannot 
have access. It’s not a right of 
suspects to be interviewed by 
major media. Likewise, when 
serious security operations are 
underway, it’s perfectly within 
the rights of the Indonesian 
government to limit media 
access to operations taking place. 
Minister Juwono: In this era of democracy, we have to 
live with freedom of the press. My concern is not so 
much in catching Noordin Top. I am more concerned 
with his example as a Robin Hood figure, that might 
catch on among young people who are attracted by 
his tactics, by his publicity as a figure fighting against 
injustice.  Even if he is arrested in the next couple of 
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weeks, the legacy of his resistance against this ‘infidel’ 
government, against injustice, would probably be 
attractive for young people.  As I said earlier, it’s not 
so much poverty as a direct cause, but it’s used by the 
educated and skilled as a way of recruiting. 
James Van Zorge: If we know where these roughly 50 
pesantren are that are linked to JI and are recruiting 
pools for Noordin, why doesn’t 
the government shut them 
down?
Minister Juwono: I think 
that would be the very last 
thing that I’d do. That’s the 
way to recruit more and 
more people—it will inflame 
and increase the oxygen of 
publicity. The best way to illustrate that is with Abu 
Bakar Ba’asyir, who 5-7 years ago was using the media 
as a way of projecting himself as this leader of Jemaah 
Islamiyah and was able to attract so many young people. 
I believe that the actual conditions within Ngruki itself, 
they didn’t actually respect Abu Bakar Ba’asyir. Now, 
he’s a spent force. Take away the oxygen of publicity 
and he’s finished.  The school itself is not the problem. 
Noor [Huda] is evidence that you can overcome what 
many people believe to be a nest of terrorists.
Noor Huda Ismail: It comes down to freedom of 
speech.  I may hate what you say but you must have 
the right to say.  You still have the Ku Klux Klan in 
America, even with a black president. I love living in 
Indonesia where you have a frenzy of different ideas. 
This is the price we have pay in a democracy. Many 
students died in the fight for this democracy. I don’t 
want to go back to the way things were during the 
Suharto era. 
H.E. Victor Zmeter, Ambassador of Lebanon, asks about 
state intervention in education programs to increase the 
availability of programs not focused on religious training, 
and about dissemination of radical ideologies. 
Sidney Jones: Indonesia has been great at the law 
enforcement side. But what is more difficult is how we 
counter some of these teachings. It’s difficult because 
we have to understand where the geographical areas 
are—where there are vulnerable pockets where the 
ideology has stronger roots than elsewhere. 
There could be pilot programs developed to target 
youth with other activities and to work with people 
who run the mosques in these areas, and to establish 
enterprises that would provide 
people coming out of those 
schools with career options. 
You have to do it in a very 
targeted way because you 
can’t just throw it out there 
and hope that it will succeed. 
For example, we’ve seen the 
government try to counter 
radical interpretations of jihad 
with other interpretations but if they aren’t read, there’s 
no point. 
You can buy magazines of JI monthly outside of the 
mosque across the street from my office, along with the 
one sheet fliers from Hizbut Tahrir and the one sheet 
flyer from Darul Islam. The scope and outreach of the 
message that we want to counter is just enormous. p


